Lessons in Unsustainable Futures: GM and the DoD

In a recent Washington Independent article, Spencer Ackerman asked the all-important, but seldom asked question, “Why Should Defense Spending Be Sacrosanct?”

It’s not popular to ask this question, especially if you’re a congressman because in doing so you’re bound to be labeled as not supportive of the troops.  However, the present course of the DOD is completely unsustainable. And in our current economic state ($12 trillion in debt and counting) I, like Ackerman and others, find it odd that there has been no serious talk of freezing the gargantuan DoD budget. In 2008, the US military spent more than the next 46 highest spending countries in the world combined (see here).

The spending problems come from personnel costs on one side — full retirement benefits for members who serve 20 years of active duty (most retire in their 40’s and now live well into their 80’s and beyond, a.k.a. 40 years of retirement pay), rising healthcare costs, salaries, housing pay, etc.  Equipment costs on the other — planes, bullets, tanks, UAV’s and an aging fleet of …well, almost every weapon system you can think of.  Just to send one combat troop to Afghanistan costs the taxpayer $1 million a year.

Almost everyone close to the organization knows we’re plowing ahead like a drunk driver headed for the cliff, but no one seems up to the task of fixing it.  Worse yet, much of the leadership seems bent on simply increasing spending rather than fixing a broken system.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates is making a noble effort, but the military-industrial complex is a three-headed monster, devouring every plan formed against it through strategic lobbying, creative bookkeeping and a view of the world based more on fantasy than reality.

Ackerman cites an October assessment from the CSBA’s Todd Harrison who compares the DoD to GM, explaining (emphasis mine),

Another similarity between the two is that both organizations are in a period of disruptive change in the competitive environment. In GM’s case, its market share rapidly eroded as gas prices climbed higher, the economy slowed, and consumers turned to smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles. GM found itself building a fleet of SUVs and trucks that consumers did not want and could not afford. Similarly, DoD now finds itself saddled with a number of weapon programs whose capabilities are ill-suited for the types of conflict the military currently faces and whose costs have risen beyond what the Department can afford. Many of the new weapons being funded today are optimized for middle-of-the- spectrum conflicts—that is, conventional, military-on-military conflicts such as Operation Desert Storm in 1991. But adversaries are well aware of the United States’ overwhelming advantage in the middle and are instead moving to either end of the spectrum: irregular warfare on one end and high-end, asymmetric warfare on the other. The challenge for DoD, as it was for GM, is that the competition is adapting faster than it can keep up.

The last sentence is key, “…the competition is adapting faster than it can keep up.” Much of it has to do with the huge, inflexible, bureaucratic organizational structure of the DoD as compared the nimble, decentralized, open-source structure embodied by al-Qaeda and affiliate organizations. One bans twitter, facebook and gmail while the other uses the internet train to organize its cells all over the world.

Changing the DOD’s organizational structure is one thing, putting a freeze on the defense budget is another and one that may be a bit more realistic. However, none of this is bound to change anytime soon if we insist on keeping our country in a state of perpetual war.

Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes … known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few.… No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. – James Madison, Political Observations, 1795

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Related posts:

1. What I’m Reading (12.17.09)
2. What I’m Reading (03.15.10)
3. The Costs of War
4. Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

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