Why the Safe Haven Argument for Afghanistan is Weak

If you follow the constant chatter of proponents for increased presence in Afghanistan, you will often hear cited the denial of Al-Qaeda safe havens as a primary reason to stay in the fight. It sounds logical at face value, but when put to close scrutiny it begins to show signs of weakness. Paul Pillar, deputy chief of the counterterrorist center at the CIA from 1997 to 1999, wrote the following in a Washington Post op-ed yesterday (emphasis mine),

How much does a haven affect the danger of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, especially the U.S. homeland? The answer to the second question is: not nearly as much as unstated assumptions underlying the current debate seem to suppose. When a group has a haven, it will use it for such purposes as basic training of recruits. But the operations most important to future terrorist attacks do not need such a home, and few recruits are required for even very deadly terrorism. Consider: The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.

In the past couple of decades, international terrorist groups have thrived by exploiting globalization and information technology, which has lessened their dependence on physical havens.

By utilizing networks such as the Internet, terrorists’ organizations have become more network-like, not beholden to any one headquarters. A significant jihadist terrorist threat to the United States persists, but that does not mean it will consist of attacks instigated and commanded from a South Asian haven, or that it will require a haven at all. Al-Qaeda’s role in that threat is now less one of commander than of ideological lodestar, and for that role a haven is almost meaningless.

On top of the fact that Al-Qaeda doesn’t need a physical piece of land to attack America, the safe haven argument is weak because many, if not most, of the insurgents we’re fighting in Afghanistan 1) are not Al-Qaeda 2) are more focused on local control than attacking the U.S. or leading a global jihad. As Harvard professor and Foreign Policy contributor, Stephen M. Walt pointed out last month,

…the Taliban itself is more of a loose coalition of different groups than a tightly unified and hierarchical organization, which is why some experts believe we ought to be doing more to divide the movement and “flip” the moderate elements to our side. Unfortunately, the “safe haven” argument wrongly suggests that the Taliban care as much about attacking America as bin Laden does.

There is no doubt that an unstable Afghanistan lends itself to exploitation by groups like Al-Qaeda, but so do Somalia and Sudan (raise your hand if you want to send thousands of troops to those two gems tomorrow….Bueller…Bueller?). If this really is, as President Obama has stated, “a war of necessity” then the American people deserve a better rationale than “denying Al-Qaeda safe havens” for adding to the $200 billion already spent in Afghanistan in the past 8 years.

As Pillar points concludes in his Washington Post piece, the issue is not whether or not Al-Qaeda would exploit an unstable Afghanistan – they would.

…the issue is whether preventing such a haven would reduce the terrorist threat to the United States enough from what it otherwise would be to offset the required expenditure of blood and treasure and the barriers to success in Afghanistan, including an ineffective regime and sagging support from the population. Thwarting the creation of a physical haven also would have to offset any boost to anti-U.S. terrorism stemming from perceptions that the United States had become an occupier rather than a defender of Afghanistan.

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Related posts:

1. Matthew Hoh’s Letter of Resignation Regarding Afghanistan
2. Why China Cares About Afghanistan
3. London, Not Central Asia the Real Terrorist Threat
4. The Strategic Debate Over Afghanistan

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